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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The survey of participants in the City Assisted Evacuation Program (CAEP) indicated a variety
of perceptions about their evacuation experience during and after Hurricane Gustav. While the
CAEP was generally regarded by most participants as successful, there are some aspects that
were identified as needing improvement. Some of these can be improved by the city; some
improvements are under the purview of the state or the federal government. Some can be fixed
expeditiously; some will require a long-term commitment.
General findings:
Almost three–quarters of the evacuees were satisfied with their experience and would use
CAEP again.
Almost 70% of participants rated their re-entry experience as good or better.
None of those surveyed expressed any concern about how their pets were sheltered and
cared for.
Over half the participants rated transportation out of the city as "good" or better.
The study findings indicate that citizens are listening to their government officials,
cooperating, and contributing to the effectiveness of the evacuation effort. Evacuation
preparedness has improved significantly since Hurricane Katrina.
Specific findings that suggest barriers to successful evacuation:
Many evacuees reported lacking adequate finances to evacuate, even with the
community‟s assisted evacuation process. Clearly, some citizens thought they had to pay
for their transportation, lodging, and food as a participant of CAEP. This finding points to
a need for the City to better communicate the array of services that it will provide to
evacuees while under the care of their government.
Others respondents reported that elderly family members who did not, would not, or
could not evacuate served as a barrier to the respondent's own evacuation.
Some citizens reported that they lacked confidence in the ability of their government to
evacuate them from harm‟s way.
The community groups and other public service organizations were under-utilized in
registering citizens in the CAEP in the months before the hurricane stuck.
While overall there were positive evaluations of the ride out of the city, some evacuees
reported negative experiences about the the bus ride out of the area – particularly from a
lack of driver training and preparation.
In addition, some respondents reported negative experiences in shelters. The latter
emerged from an almost universally reported feeling that those staffing the shelters “did
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not want them here.” Evacuees, particularly the elderly, reported feeling unsafe at
shelters.
Respondents expressed concerns about being returned to their homes when their
neighborhoods lacked full return of utilities and public services. Improvement with the
re-entry process is needed through better coordination with local officials to know the
condition of neighborhoods: electricity, food, medical services, and local transportation,
the latter that is required to get the evacuee from the re-entry drop-off point to their
homes.
Post Gustav change:
The challenging job of maintaining an accurate and up-to-date CAEP database of citizens
needing evacuation assistance is critical to the success of the program. Since hurricane
Gustav, the Regional Transit Authority has arranged to take over the maintenance of that
database. The RTA's use of an automated system to contact and verify registrants is an
important step to addressing what was a very personnel-intensive effort for the Office of
Emergency Preparedness. This new capacity is a very good improvement in the program.
We recommend that the city and state work collaboratively toward continued
improvement of the CAEP by involving city, state, federal, non-governmental, private
sector and academic organizations.
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INTRODUCTION1
When Hurricane Gustav threatened the City of New Orleans in August of 2008, the City
implemented its City-assisted Evacuation Plan (CAEP). The purpose of the City Assisted
Evacuation Plan (CAEP) is to help citizens who want to evacuate during an emergency, but are
unable to evacuate on their own. The CAEP is not intended to replace individuals‟ and families‟
capacity to prepare and implement their own evacuation. It is meant to be an evacuation strategy
of last resort and only for those citizens who have no other means or, have physical limitations
that prohibit self evacuation. Those who believe they need assistance are asked to call the City‟s
311 hotline and answer the phone survey. Citizens are then notified via postcard with further
information about pick-up procedures and bus stop locations and their information is kept in a
database for assistance during an evacuation.
The City‟s evacuation plan has been carefully developed since Hurricane Katrina in August
2005. The revised CAEP was based on improvements and recommendations by a post-Katrina
collaborative regional network of NGOs, private, and government agencies meeting periodically
under the guidance of the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness in the years
between Katrina and Gustav.
In the days just prior to Gustav‟s landfall, the CAEP was implemented. Initial results indicated a
marked improvement in the City‟s ability to mobilize resources and personnel to effectively
assist in the evacuation of needy citizens. Yet the Mayor wanted to know what problems were
experienced by the citizens of New Orleans using the CAEP during the evacuation. To that end,
the Mayor requested the Director of the City‟s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness to evaluate the program. The Director asked UNO Professors Pam Jenkins and
John Kiefer of UNO-CHART2 for assistance in providing a sound, research-based approach to
measure the success. As with any university research effort, Professors Jenkins and Kiefer were
grateful to the perseverance, skills and assistance of their graduate research assistants, MPA
student James Noe and sociology master‟s student Brian Morris.
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Funding sources for this work included UNO-CHART, Grantmakers in Aging, and the unpaid effort of 20 graduate
students in the Fall, 2008 class “Profession of Public Administration,” without whose assistance this research
project would not have been possible.
2
UNO-CHART is a university based, applied research center with focus on assisting coastal communities in reducing
their risk to coastal storms and relevant environmental challenges.
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METHODOLOGY
In October of 2008, the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness provided an
electronic database to the UNO research team. The database contained contact information for
over 18,000 registrants from 7,000 families who had signed up for city-assisted evacuation.
From that database, the research team generated a random sample of over 700 names for the
survey. Next, a survey, included as Appendix One, was designed by the research team, and
reviewed by the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. Twenty volunteer
graduate students, trained in survey administration, systematically contacted the registrants
included in the sample over a period of two months (October and November of 2008). One
hundred and fifty-six registrants reported either that they did not evacuate or declined to
participate in the study. Three hundred and forty were registered for the CAEP, but used other
means to evacuate. We did not interview those who did not evacuate; only those who evacuated.
We did not gather detailed data from those who were registered for the CAEP but evacuated by
other means, other than asking them how they evacuated and to what location. As a result, 364
surveys were successfully completed. The results were analyzed by the research team beginning
in January, 2009. This yielded results with a 95% confidence level and a margin of error of 5%.
FINDINGS
Those Who Did Not Evacuate
Those who were registered for CAEP and did not evacuate reported a variety of reasons for not
evacuating. These included finances, elderly parents, illness and medical disability, and a lack of
trust in the system. We must stress, however, that we did not have a sufficient data in our survey
to make any conclusive assessments of reasons for not evacuating. This is an opportunity for
subsequent research.
Those Who Evacuated
** Family Relationships Were an Important Influence on an Evacuation Decision **
The reasons the respondents gave for evacuation varied. For some, the memory of Katrina was
the motivating factor. Connected to the memory of Katrina was their belief that it was a
mandatory evacuation. What is clear from the survey is how connected the vulnerable population
is to the actions of their families about staying or evacuating.
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Those who were registered for CAEP and did evacuate reported the following:

Figure 1. Evacuation Methods
Question: How did you evacuate from the City?

n=626

Of those that evacuated and were registered for the CAEP, 41% used city-assisted
evacuation
Of those that evacuated and were registered for the CAEP, 59% did not actually use cityassisted evacuation
For the most part, when respondents who were registered for the CAEP did not use the
city evacuation, they used their networks of family and friends. They left with their
daughters, brothers, grandsons, or neighbors. Primarily, residents left in vehicles, but a
small number reported flying out of New Orleans.
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Figure 2. Reasons for CAEP Registration
Question: Why did you sign up for the city-assisted evacuation plan?
** "Just in case…." **

n=364

Almost half the participants surveyed reported they did not own a vehicle.
One quarter of the participants reported they either could not afford to evacuate on their
own or that their vehicle was mechanically unreliable.
The same themes of family and vulnerability emerge as the most salient issues for their
registration to CAEP. People said that they registered “Just in case...” Others stated that
their children registered for them, or they registered themselves and their ailing parent or
grandmother. These reasons illustrate the legacy of Katrina and the capacity of the city to
publicize its program.
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Figure 3. Enrollment Methods
Question: How did you get enrolled in the city-assisted evacuation program?

n=364

Three quarters of the participants enrolled in the CAEP by calling 311 themselves.
A variety of organizations referred citizens to CAEP. These organizations included
Volunteers of America, dialysis centers, Senior Citizen groups, HUD, VA Hospital ARC,
and home health assistance. Referral by outside groups seems to be an important avenue
that might be developed before the next Hurricane season to reach those who are in need
of evacuation assistance.
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Figure 4. Satisfaction with CAEP
Question: How satisfied are you with the CAEP?

n=364

Almost three-quarters of the participants were satisfied with the CAEP.
Only 15% were dissatisfied with the CAEP.
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Table 1. CAEP-evacuated Registrants' Evacuee Sites
Question: Where did you evacuate to?
There was a variety of places where people found refuge. Most were in Louisiana, Arkansas,
Alabama, Tennessee, Georgia and Mississippi.
State
Alabama

Location

Total
32
Birmingham
16
Mussel Shoals
1
Mobile
1
“a military place”
1
Unspecified
13
40
Louisiana
Shreveport
23
Alexandria
5
Denham Springs
1
Baton Rouge
4
Monroe
5
Raceland
1
Bossier City
1
Ruston
1
17
Tennessee
Memphis
5
Knoxville
2
Jackson
2
Unspecified
8
14
Arkansas
Fort Chaffee
1
Fort Smith
2
Unspecified
11

State
Georgia

Location

Total
2
Atlanta
1
Decatur
1
5
Texas
Houston
1
Dallas
1
Arlington
1
Unspecified
2
6
Kentucky
Louisville
5
Unspecified
1
2
Mississippi
Meridian
1
Unspecified
1
Unspecified
4
Virginia
Unspecified
3
South Carolina
3
Oklahoma
Oklahoma City
1
Unspecified
2
62
Unknown/Declined
174
Missing/Unreadable
n=364
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Table 2. Self-evacuated Registrants' Refuge Sites
State
Alabama

Location

Total
19
Birmingham
4
Mobile
1
Montgomery
1
Tuscaloosa
1
Huntsville
1
Unspecified
11
41
Louisiana
Shreveport
3
Alexandria
8
Baton Rouge
9
Hammond
1
Mandeville
1
Pineville
1
Patterson
1
Gonzales
1
Monroe
3
Franklinton
1
Slidell
3
Bossier City
1
Grand Prairie
1
Faraday
1
Lafayette
3
Sorrento
1
Unspecified
2
12
Tennessee
Memphis
7
Jackson
2
Pigeon Forge
1
Nashville
1
Unspecified
1
2
Arkansas
Unspecified
2

State
Georgia

Location

Total
35
Alpharetta
1
Atlanta
23
Douglasville
1
Jonesboro
1
Albany
1
Union City
1
Unspecified
7
25
Texas
Houston
9
Dallas
5
San Antonio
5
Arlington
1
Unspecified
5
17
Mississippi
Fayette
1
Biloxi
1
Hattiesburg
1
Hazlehurst
1
Jackson
1
Meridian
2
McComb
1
Unspecified
9
2
Florida
Destin
1
Pensacola
1
Unspecified
6
North Carolina
Unspecified
3
California
Unspecified
3
Pennsylvania
Unspecified
4
Maryland
72
Unknown/Declined
171
Missing/Unreadable

n=340
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Figure 5. Residents’ Rating of Transportation
Question: How would you rate the transportation out of the city?
** Like 18 hours to get there - bus driver went to sleep on the road - went into the ditch in
Alexandria **

n=364

Over half the participants rated the transportation out of the city as good or better.
Less than one in five thought the transportation out of the city was poor.
Overall, the transport from the city was met with stoicism and gratitude. Individuals
ranked the system as “good” even if the buses were crowded or the train ride was too
long.
Several comments show the variety:
o “They picked us up from our home and brought us to the train station. From there
we went by ambulance to the airport and were taken by helicopter to LSU. All our
needs were met so I was happy.”
o “Wonderful ambulance took me to airport”
The majority of the negative comments concerned the bus rides and, in particular, the bus
drivers. These comments were so frequent, this topic needs further exploration.

11

o Like 18 hours to get there; bus driver went to sleep on the road; went into the
ditch in Alexandria; had to get a wrecker to pull us out; took like 4 hours just to
do that; looked like the drivers were too tired when left from O‟Keefe plaza – 334
Union Station. Going to greyhound station we was forced to go; police told my
wife and I if you didn‟t go you would go to jail; lost a lot of my stuff and FEMA
refused to help.
o There was bumper to bumper traffic. We almost ran out of gas but were able to
pull over. My sister has diabetes and lost her sight and it was hard on our legs to
sit in the car all that time. We should have taken the bus out, but I like having my
own stuff.
o No food, military food; uncomfortable; sitting in dining area for 15 or 16 hours in
a dining room chair, very mad while it was happening but very thankful once he
got home and realized that people were trying to help him.
NOTE: Transportation out of the city is a State of Louisiana DOTD responsibility.
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Figure 6. Shelter Types
Question: Do you happen to know what type of shelter you were in?

n=364

Overall, what was your shelter experience like?
** Most of those sheltered reported a negative experience **
Of those who commented on the shelter, 72 had negative comments, 54 had positive comments.
Several had comments that could not be categorized. For the most part, the negative comments
were very negative, while many of the positive comments were “It‟s okay, it wasn‟t a hotel, but
okay.” The negative comments were about the facilities, the supplies, but more often, the way
that people were treated, “They acted like they didn‟t want us here.”
What would you suggest to improve the shelter experience?
All the factors mentioned by the evacuees appear doable: safety, security, better staff, better
food, beds that elderly can actually get up and down from, possibly of some segregated facilities
for elderly and families. In several shelters, it was clear to the evacuees that they were not
wanted. Again, several of the comments inferred a connection between their shelter experience
and a reluctance to evacuate again:
I don‟t have to go through it again; I‟m staying home next time and I will never go back
again
13

Figure 7. Satisfaction with Re-entry
Question: How would you rate your re-entry experience?
** “The bus driver was very helpful. The people were considerate and humble.” **

n=364

Almost 70% of participants rated their re-entry experience as good or better.
For the most part, the comments were good, saying that they were grateful to get home
and people treated them well on bus, plane, or train.
This comment is an example of the positive comments: “The bus driver was very
helpful. The people were considerate and humble and it was a togetherness.”
The negative comments were more varied. Some thought that they were brought back to
the city too soon and others thought they were brought back too late. Those that thought
they were brought back too early did not have electricity or food.
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Question: What would you do to improve the re-entry experience?
** “The lights in the city needed to come on sooner.” **
For the most part, the respondents did not have many suggestions. They stated that the lights in
the city needed to come on sooner and they needed to get home faster. Other comments included
the feeling that the process should be more organized.
The comments referring to their re-entry experience that contribute to their reluctance to
participate in future evacuations are:
“Came back that night and had to go to the hospital and not too many people there. I
almost died had to give me blood transfusion; should have stayed in Pensacola; Tulane
didn‟t have many people that Thursday night.”
“Horrible. They had no buses for special needs. It was a bad experience; I am glad to be
alive.”

Figure 8. Travel and Family
Question: Did you travel with family members?

n=364

Almost 80% of those using CAEP traveled with family members.
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Figure 9. Number of People Traveling Together
Question: How many other members of your household traveled with you?

n=364

Most households traveled with three people.
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Figure 10. Travel with Pets
Question: Did you travel with pets?

n=364

Less than one in five of those who used the CAEP traveled with pets.
More than adequate provision was made for the pets, a very excellent accomplishment
given the problems faced with pet evacuation during Hurricane Katrina.
It should be noted that there were far fewer evacuees using CAEP and traveling with pets
than estimated by the Louisiana SPCA. We suggest that there is a need for more
assessment of the numbers of CAEP participants that will travel with pets in future
evacuations.
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Figure 11. Number of Pets Evacuated
Question: For those who traveled with pets, when asked “How many pets traveled with you?”

n=66

For those who traveled with pets, most traveled with only one pet.
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Figure 12. Pet Carrier
Question: For those who traveled with pets, when asked
“Do you have a pet carrier for each of your pets?”

n=66

Over 80% of those who traveled with pets had a pet carrier for each pet.
However, less than 25% of those traveling with pets brought carriers with them. In most
cases, carriers were provided at intake by the Louisiana SPCA. None of those surveyed
expressed concern about how their pets were sheltered and cared for. This suggests that
CAEP participants have confidence in the ability of the City and LASPCA to care for
their pets during an evacuation and, given the concern about pet evacuation during
Hurricane Katrina indicates an important barrier to evacuation of pet owners has been
diminished.
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Figure 13. Use of CAEP in the Future
Question: Would you use the city assisted evacuation program again?

n=364

Over three-quarters of those who used CAEP said they would use it again.
What would you do to improve the CAEP?
Most of the criticisms were about the organization, especially the pick-up stops. Several
citizens mentioned that they should be able to know where they are going. Again, we include
those comments that reflect how the process influenced what people would do next time.
“Nothing because it was horrible, a waste of my time to try to fix it.”
“Set it up ahead of time. Plan it out. Everybody is not fortunate enough to plan their own
evacuation. They need a plan. I see the news everyday and it‟s not getting any better. 311
made you feel they did have a plan. I knew I had to get to Greyhound bus station and ok
I‟m going to a shelter; thousands and thousands of people in that shelter – can you
imagine? Beds close together and I got my son here; 3 sex offenders in shelter; they
register you in computer; your child could be laying next to a sex offender; people were
scared; people fighting over a cup of coffee…”
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Figure 14. Future Evacuation Plans
Question: Given your experience, will you evacuate for the next storm?

n=364

Almost three-quarters of the participants in the CAEP reported that, given their
experience, they would evacuate again.
Of the nearly one-quarter of the citizens who said they wouldn‟t leave, the responses can
be divided into three categories: 1) financial issues that will stop people from evacuating
again; 2) those whose experience in Gustav discouraged them from considering
evacuating in the future; and 3) those who expressed a kind of fatalism about the storm
season.
The three categories identified above present significant challenges to ensuring a
complete evacuation. They will be difficult to overcome and call for innovative
solutions. With regard to the third category, we suggest that efforts be made to urge
congregational outreach to convince vulnerable citizens that they should use the CAEP.
The Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness should continue to
provide CAEP information to the faith community each year.
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Figure 15. Medical Conditions
Question: Do you have any of the following conditions?

n=364

Almost three-quarters of those participating in the CAEP had no disability
More than one-quarter of those participating in the CAEP had a major disability.
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Figure 16. Caregivers
Question: Do you need a caregiver who would be with you during the evacuation?

n=364

Eighty-five percent of those who used CAEP did not need a caregiver with them during
the evacuation.
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Figure 17. Need for Caregivers
Question: What type of assistance do you require on a daily basis?

n=364

The most common type of medical assistance needed by CAEP participants is taking
medication and mobility assistance.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
No plan and implementation for evacuating New Orleans or any urban area will be perfect. In
the more than three years since Hurricane Katrina, the City adopted a process of continued
improvement in evacuation planning. However, the survey indicated that there are still needs
that must be addressed to ensure a more complete evacuation of the city‟s most vulnerable
citizens.

Finances
Some surveyed reported that a lack of finances served as a barrier to evacuation. While on its
surface this may seem to point to a need to better educate evacuees that there are no costs for
CAEP evacuation – i.e. transportation, meals, and shelter are provided by the government – in
reality, some of those surveyed reported that this was not the case. Most notably, several
reported that there was no food at one shelter, and they had to “go to McDonalds.” Working
collaboratively with the state (who is charged with the responsibility for sheltering) may achieve
an evacuation for the most vulnerable that will not require resources that they do not have.

Other Family Members
Throughout this survey, the strength of family ties in this community emerged. For example,
some people reported that elderly family members would not evacuate and were not registered
for the CAEP. For those who participated in the CAEP, many stated that family relationships
were critical to their decision to evacuate. Here we would suggest that some provision of
registering “family units” be considered. We suggest that evacuation be promoted as a „family‟
event.

Lack of Trust in the System
While lack of trust remains a barrier to evacuation, New Orleans is not unique among American
cities in this distrust. Trust in government requires the involvement of all the city‟s agencies, not
just the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. Street-level bureaucrats
within the police department, social services and other agencies often set the tone for the climate
in the community. We would suggest immediate implementation of proactive, two-way
communication between citizens and government agencies to achieve a safe environment with
regard to disasters. One particularly effective model is Project SAFE. In Oakland, California, a
local partnership of government, businesses and private citizens forged a partnership to reduce
the costs and consequences of disasters. The purpose of Project SAFE (Safety And Future
Empowerment) is to ensure that public safety continues to be a top priority, and ensures that
businesses and the community will be safer and less prone to damage or losses from major
emergencies. As a pilot community for Project SAFE, Oakland received seed monies, support
and resources from FEMA to encourage loss reduction community activities. This would involve
25

initiatives where agencies could demonstrate their responsiveness to citizen concerns and needs
through appropriate and timely action taken by the city in response to those concerns and needs.
Certainly, this survey was a step in that direction. Many of those surveyed were both surprised
and pleased that their city was concerned about how they fared during the evacuation. (see
http://www.oaklandnet.com/oakweb/fire/safe/project.html for information on Project SAFE in
Oakland.)
One way to contribute to building trust is to widely publish the results of this citizen survey, and
follow it with periodic updates as to how the city is improving the planning and implementation
of the CAEP.
Enrollment in CAEP
While it was beyond the scope of this survey, press reports indicated that there were long delays
in registering for CAEP in the days and hours before Hurricane Gustav made landfall.
Telephone lines were overwhelmed. Yet the program had been in effect for several years prior
to Gustav. Data showed that only 7% registered for CAEP through external organizations. We
think there may be an opportunity for the city to work with organizations such as Volunteers of
America, dialysis centers, senior citizens groups, AARP, hospitals, pharmacies and others well in
advance of hurricane season to identify and register vulnerable citizens. We recommend an
emphasis by the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness on partnership with
NGOs in order to identify and register their stakeholders. We also recommend that local
physicians and pharmacists be included in the effort to identify and register their patients and
customers who may qualify for CAEP. The latter effort may be expeditiously started by means
of a sheet of instructions provided to physicians and pharmacists that outlines enrollment
procedures and qualifications.
A large number of citizens registered for CAEP, but did not use it during Hurricane Gustav
(59%). This high number of registrants who did not use CAEP evacuation reflects the
uncertainty of individuals‟ plans. Some individuals registered with CAEP „just in case‟ other
plans for their evacuation fell through. While this may prove to make planning for the city more
difficult, it is significant that citizens thought through their plans enough to register with the
City. Balancing encouragement to register for those who need assistance with encouragement to
make alternative plans when they are feasible is a challenge that the City faces. Closer
partnership with the community and the stakeholder NGOs by the City can help build citizen
confidence that they have made the correct evacuation decision. To the extent that the City helps
citizens create their own evacuation plans, the numbers who register for CAEP will be more
accurate.
Maintaining the currency and accuracy of the CAEP database has always been a manpower
intensive challenge for the city. The local Red Cross chapter had been doing call-back
verification, but this year the Regional Transit Authority is taking over that task and will use an
automated system to contact and verify registrants. The use of this automated system is an
important step for ensuring a viable database. The same process has been tested and proven
operationally effective by the Miami-Dade Office of Emergency Preparedness.
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Transportation Out of the City
While slightly over half of the participants rated transportation out of the city as good or better,
about one-fifth felt the transportation was poor. The majority of the negative comments
concerned the bus rides. We suggest that the most significant improvements can be made in
driver training and fuel replenishment planning. We recommend implementation of programs to
educate and train drivers about the complexities and uncertainties that are the hallmark of
evacuations. We further recommend that a program be initiated to educate citizens about what to
expect when participating in CAEP.
Sheltering
Shelter experiences were mostly negative. We would recommend that those staffing shelters
undergo more specific training that includes the physical and cultural needs of evacuees.
Participant comments indicated that many felt that they were negatively stereotyped by shelter
personnel. Many residents, particularly the elderly and those with small children, felt unsafe.
While some shelters made special provisions for segregating older evacuees, most did not. We
would recommend that planning for the elderly be specifically addressed and commensurate
familiarity with their special needs by those staffing shelters become common practice.
Bedding, particularly for the elderly, was widely reported as inadequate. We recommend that
the State Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness conduct a more
detailed study of the sheltering experiences of CAEP participants.

Re-entry
Many CAEP participants reported that significant hardships were experienced during re-entry.
But although there were problems with re-entry in some neighborhoods, almost 70% of evacuees
rated their re-entry experience as good or better. For those that gave negative comments, most
included being brought back “too soon,” or “too late.” For those reporting “too soon,” the major
complaint was lack of electricity and availability of food in their neighborhoods. Some reported
a lack of medical services in their neighborhood.
We recommend that better planning for the condition of a neighborhood be done prior to
returning evacuees. Participants may be given an opportunity to decide when to return home.
Therefore, as was done in Gustav, it is likely that temporary shelters will need to be established
in the city for the returning CAEP participants.

Satisfaction with CAEP
Almost ¾ of the participants were satisfied with CAEP and reported that they would use CAEP
again. If people understand that CAEP works, the evacuation of the city will be far more
effective in the future.
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Other Findings
Three other findings are of note. First, most of those who used the CAEP did not have a
disability. Second, less than one in five evacuees traveled with pets. Third, and perhaps most
important, is that citizens listened and cooperated with the city, resulting in an effective
evacuation of the city when a dangerous storm threatened.
By any standard, the City of New Orleans‟ evacuation preparedness has improved significantly
since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Much of this has been due to the headway made in inter- and
intra-governmental cooperation since Katrina. The planning process, under the leadership of the
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, has made noteworthy efforts toward
ensuring an inclusive evacuation of the city. Citizens are now more inclined to listen to and
understand the importance and urgency of evacuation orders and credit must be given to our
citizens for making the right decisions during times of stress and uncertainty.
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